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ABSTRACT 
The airline industry is a diverse sector, requiring the support of a varied range of ancillary 
businesses such as maintenance, catering and travel agencies to carry out its activities. Many 
of these supporting businesses demonstrate the potential to drive wider profit margins despite 
generating lower revenues than the airlines themselves, making them attractive investment 
opportunities in a sector prone to volatile and often lacklustre trading. This study investigates 
two of the largest diversified airline groups, Germany’s Lufthansa Group and Dubai’s 
Emirates Group, each adopting a distinct approach towards diversification that may serve as a 
model for airline groups worldwide. The areas investigated were Cargo, Maintenance, 
Catering and Travel Services. The research found that whilst diversification may not always 
present the most attractive option financially, strategic factors can often outweigh such 
concerns. Business units studied were found to have variable prospects; particularly in the 
case of Catering, a sector on the rise - versus in-house Maintenance, which for airlines, is 
likely to see decline. The pursuit of third party revenue streams to offset weak internal trading 
and growth of competencies were found to be the key drivers of success. Interplay between 
segments was also apparent, showing that a well-organised diversification strategy can 
achieve robust cross-functional benefits and deliver significant value to the parent 
organisation. 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate diversification within the airline business has a long history. Many of the first 
airlines were initiated as related sub-ventures by existing transport-focused organisations; 
such as United Airlines, which can trace its lineage to Boeing Air Transport in 1927 
(Rodgers, 1996). As the industry grew and matured, Pan American World Airways came to 
epitomise the concept of a global aviation services empire, with subsidiaries such as Pan Am 
World Services and the still active Intercontinental Hotels brand, allowing it to strategically 
extend its reach into higher margin sectors, whilst supporting the objectives and needs of its 
core business. 
In a highly-cyclical business such as air transport, it is arguably difficult to maintain a long-
term strategic scope whilst managing non-core assets effectively. The Emirates and the 
Lufthansa Groups are both highly successful airline conglomerates but given the propensity 
for diversified business units to often outperform the core passenger business of an airline, 
the question arises as to what their overall contribution to core results are. 
This will be investigated through a specific analysis of the Lufthansa and Emirates Groups, 
both individually and comparatively. Each has been chosen due to their industry prevalence 
and ability to serve as emblematic representations of legacy carriers, acting as bellwethers for 
broader industry trends. The business units focussed upon have been chosen on the basis of 
the size of their revenue contributions to each group. These units are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 Business Units Investigated 
Company Business Unit Market Sector 
Emirates SkyCargo Cargo/air freight 
DLM and Travel Services Travel 
Catering Flight Catering 
Lufthansa Logistics Cargo/air freight 
Technik Maintenance Repair and 
Overhaul 
LSG SkyChefs Flight Catering 
 
The study’s specific research questions are to discover how diversified business units drive 
airline parent company strategy and vice versa, how the strategic value of an airline business 
unit is measured and how individual business units belonging to larger airline Groups 
succeed or fail. The overriding aim of the study is to investigate how the present state of 
airline business diversification has been achieved at both Lufthansa and Emirates. 
This study is not intended to determine if there is any particular ‘right or wrong’ way to 
pursue diversification, but instead to analyse how diversified business units might assist 
parent airline groups in achieving their corporate objectives, using a mix of qualitative and 
quantitative methodologies as described in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1 Methodology Outline 
 
Initial context will be provided by a review of relevant company and airline diversification 
literature (Section 2). The data and methods strategy is then summarised in Section 3. 
Thematic areas for further analysis stemming from the literature review process were merged 
together with a quantitative assessment of Group financial records and trends for the period 
2009-2014 along with a unique Strategic Scoring Method especially adapted for this study 
(Section 4). Commonly applied BCG and ANSOFF frameworks (Section 5) are finally 
devised for the two airline Groups to arrive at a set of reliable conclusions and 
recommendations (Section 6). Excerpts from industry experts interviewed for this study are 
reported across sections 2 to 6 in support of the quantitative data on the two airline groups. 
2. Diversification as a strategy 
 
Although diversification is a well-researched phenomenon in academic literature, having 
been explored by noted economists (Schumpeter, 1942 in Dinapoulis, 1994. Ansoff, 1957. 
Porter, 1980. Teece, 1986), there is a relative dearth of material relating directly to the topic 
of airline diversification strategy from a group, or umbrella-company viewpoint. Case-by-
case analysis has been carried out in recent years (Heracleous, 2004, Lindstädt and Fauser, 
2004, Jones, 2007), with attention paid to their individual contributions. 
 
Aside from the core competency of flying passengers, airlines have sought to diversify and 
extend the reach of their capabilities and revenue streams. It has been shown to have a 
significant impact on company fortunes (Hitt et al, 1997), provided the nature of the firm’s 
strategy is ‘related’ (Geringer et al, 2000) in some way to its core competency. Where firms 
engage in ‘unrelated’ diversification - whereby Business Units (BU’s) lack commonality and 
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fail to support the core competency - potential for sharing of benefits is reduced, resulting in 
an inflation of cost and dilution of management expertise and organisational resources 
(Campbell, 1992). 
 
Common airline diversification strategies have encompassed Cargo, Maintenance Repair and 
Overhaul (MRO), Catering, Information Technology (IT) and Leisure Management / Travel 
Agencies (Jenkins et al, 2012, O’Connell, 2007, Suen, 2002).  As such, related diversification 
within the air transport industry seeks to support passenger operations with business units 
providing relevant or aligned services. For example, cargo may be seen as a direct by-product 
of airlines’ seeking to leverage otherwise unused bellyhold capacity - with some then 
diversifying further into pure-freighter operations. Additionally, an integrated IT business 
unit may serve to support an airline’s booking system, upon which it is heavily dependent.  
 
The motives behind airline group diversification are closely linked to strategic market 
positioning (Porter, 1980) and growth (Ansoff, 1957). Ansoff notes that a company’s avenues 
to growth are fourfold: enhanced market penetration, market stimulation, product 
development or diversification - the latter carrying the most risk if mishandled, but the least if 
executed competently. However, Ansoff’s growth solution does not account for the need to 
negate strategic threats. As a standalone business, a company may not be able to respond to 
competitors through core activities alone. Here diversification may aid in fulfilling Porter’s 
need for a company to ‘relate to its environment’ to achieve strategic success.  A group’s 
ability to exhibit strength in all aspects of Porter’s ‘five forces’ model will inform and 
validate its underlying ability to deliver profits (O’Connell, 2007). An example of an airline 
group successfully engaging with the five forces through leveraging non-core business units 
can be seen in the Emirates Group’s diversification strategy, as illustrated in Table 2. 
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Table 2 Emirates’ Response to Porters 5 Forces 
Force Threat Reason(s) Response(s) 
Competitive Rivalry Very High Fast growing local 
competition 
Joint-venture with 
Qantas 
Legacy carriers 
successfully reducing 
costs 
Supplier Bargaining 
Power 
Moderate Strong global MRO 
sector controlled by 
competitors 
Establishement of 
EK Engineering as a 
regional leader 
Need for flight 
caterting at all points 
of call 
Global covergage of 
Dnata catering 
operations 
Buyer Bargaining 
Power 
High Increasing 
dominance of online 
price-comparison 
Growth of Emirates-
owned direct sales 
channels 
Threat of Potential 
Entrants 
High Rise of well-financed 
rivals: Etihad, Qatar, 
Turkish and Air 
Arabia 
Launch of flydubai to 
tackle Air Arabia and 
reduce threat from 
other current and 
would-be LCCs 
Launch of Emirates 
Executive* 
Threat of Substitutes Low Teleconferencing 
growth prompted by 
financial crisis 
Focus on Business 
Rewards Programme 
(with growing 
number of 
participating 
partners) 
*Emirates Executive is a response in part to Qatar Executive and Etihad ‘The Residence’ product 
Source Author research/interviews 
 
Here it is observable that in addition to responding to the threats of ‘Competitive Rivalry’ and 
‘Potential Entrants’ with core-competencies, the remainder of Emirates’ diversified structure 
aids in creating a stronger platform to bolster its strategic position within Porter’s forces 
framework. In each instance, Emirates is able to deliver an in-house solution from its 
diversified portfolio to meet strategic issues relevant to its passenger transport business, 
despite said solutions not directly involving the transport of passengers. For example, 
services arm Dnata is able to cover much of Emirates’ global catering needs whilst also 
generating incremental revenue by supplying the needs of competitors. This is known as 
‘Economies of Diversification’ (Berger and Humphrey, 1991. Grosskopf et al, 1992, Chavas 
and Kim, 2010), whereby the economies of scale and scope provided by growing the business 
to supply the market at large ultimately serve to make Emirates’ own catering more cost-
effective, strengthen its strategic standing and delivering tangible returns to the core-business. 
Beyond strategic positioning, it is important to note the desire of airlines to avoid over-
specialisation in a high-risk, low-margin industry. Diversification empowers airlines to avoid 
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dependence on one product line, to achieve greater stability of profits, to make greater use of 
an existing distribution system and to acquire value chain know-how. 
 
Kock and Guillen (2001) assert that the diversification strategy pursued by a firm is 
inherently informed by its competencies by default. This may be seen in the air transport 
industry through the proliferation of related ventures helping to drive the core strategy of an 
airline group. For example, Lufthansa Group has grown its expertise derived from the need to 
deliver internal Information Technology solutions through establishing and growing its IT 
division. This supports the airline’s need for cost-effective IT projects, but is controlled by 
the corporate principals of the Lufthansa Group
1
. Associated benefits include the elimination 
of the need to constantly reinforce service level agreements with third party suppliers, as well 
as a corresponding reduction in the number of potentially difficult to control variables in its 
IT supply chain (Jones, 2007), such as software development and systems maintenance. 
 
Ketler and Walstrom (1993) note that outsourcing is impacted heavily by organisational 
characteristics, as well as vendor and contract issues. Within the airline industry, evidence 
exists to illustrate that diversification represents a more controllable (Pakneiat et al, 2010) 
and more administrable (Heracleous et al, 2004) alternative for carriers which possess the 
scale to fully realise the benefits of its adoption. 
 
MRO serves as a useful example of a revenue stream that can provide significant tangible 
benefits, but also incur large costs. With the potential to represent 10-15% of an airline’s 
operational overheads (Al-Kaabi, Potter and Naim, 2007, Kilpi and Ari, 2004, CAPA, 2014), 
MRO presents a compelling case for pursuing an outsourcing strategy when viewed at face 
value. However, where in-demand technical competency can be married to the prospect of 
generating incremental revenue, in-sourcing functions such as MRO can pay notable 
dividends - provided the business unit is capable of supplying third parties to a meaningful 
degree of revenue generation. An example of this may be seen in Delta Airlines’ investing in 
AeroMexico for the primary purpose of building its MRO portfolio (CAPA, 2011). 
Heracleous et al. (2004, 2009) highlight the notion that related diversification into higher 
margin sectors not only provides healthy alternative revenue streams, but also in their 
analysis of Singapore Airlines Engineering provide practical evidence of a business unit 
simultaneously servicing the core business (Singapore Airlines), as well as improving group-
level costs and reinforcing group service standards. 
 
Where a carrier lacks the scale to profitably support its own needs and sell to third parties, the 
prospect of diversification may seem less attractive (Heikkila and Cordon, 2002); conversely 
a carrier of Lufthansa’s scale arguably allows it to overcome high competitive density, with 
seven out of ten of its major competitors operating major MRO businesses in close regional 
proximity (Tegtmeier, 2005 in Aviation Week, 2011). As such, when applied in scale, 
diversification presents a sensible strategic option, especially if viewed from the perspective 
                                                          
1
 Personal interview with Harald Heppner, Manager Corporate Strategy, Lufthansa Group. 
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that MRO in particular is a more stable business than passenger transport – positioning it as 
an offset against the cyclicality of the airline business (Kilpi and Vepsalainen, 2004). 
 
Ansoff supports this notion, noting, “if (a firm’s) diversification objective is to correct cyclic 
variations in demand that are characteristic of the industry, it would choose an opportunity 
that lies outside” (pg. 122, Ansoff, 1957). However, emerging trends in this market such as 
the encroachment of Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM’s) will begin to erode the 
position of even strong providers like Lufthansa, with Airbus already predicting 25% of its 
revenues to be generated by MRO sales by 2020 (Aviation Week, 2011). 
 
The strategic benefits of diversification benefits can formally be broken down into the 
mitigation of financial risks, marketing power, and knowledge gain.  
 
2.1 Mitigation of financial risks 
 
The sharing of financial risk across a diversified corporate structure presents an additional 
positive aspect to this concept when applied in a controlled, related manner (Lubatkin and 
Rogers, 1989), due to the sharing of associated costs between business units. For example, 
much of the infrastructure required for cargo operations overlaps with those required for 
passenger transport, reducing the overall exposure to financial risk and investment, whilst 
collapsing operational costs over two revenue streams
2
. However, it has also been argued that 
such units may reduce risk by being responsible for their own P&L (Lindstadt and Fauser, 
2004, Taneja, 2004), due to the supposed greater duty of financial responsibility this places 
on each unit. 
 
A useful case illustrating the strength of pursuing related supporting ventures such as MRO, 
Catering and Information Technology over units more subject to industry cyclicality, such as 
subsidiary airlines (as per Kilpi and Ari, 2004) is Swissair. Related diversification into low-
margin sectors, such as starting or purchasing other airlines may serve to “increase, rather 
than diversify risk” (Suen, 2002), as opposed to non-flying, high margin business units, 
which demonstrably serve to counter this, as can be inferred from Suen’s analysis. 
 
Suen (2002) comprehensively illustrates the manner in which Swissair’s investment strategy 
was misguided with the assertion that SAirLines was grossly outperformed by its services 
divisions - comparing returns of 0.9% for SAirLines in 2000 versus a high of 32.4% for its 
cargo division SAirLogistics. The ability of its high-margin, non-flying subsidiaries to absorb 
financial risk is apparent from their EBIT between 1997 and 2000 – showing that non-flying 
divisions almost consistently delivered a greater combined result than the airline itself, 
culminating in an average earnings ratio of approximately 2:1 against passenger operations. 
Arguably, had the SAir Group focussed on these types of business, rather than investing in 
loss-making equity airline partners such as the chronically unprofitable Sabena, then it may 
                                                          
2
 Personal interview with Ram Menen, Divisional Senior Vice President, Emirates SkyCargo (retired). 
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have been better positioned to respond to the spate of disasters that befell it between 1999 and 
2001. 
 
Looking towards the future, investment into middle-ground investments that may arguably 
straddle the fields of related and unrelated diversification within the air transport industry has 
not yet seen much academic discussion. Krishnan and Ellis (2008) note that Berkshire 
Hathaway serves as an example of a business with aviation interests that pursues a highly 
successful, yet largely unrelated investment strategy. They additionally argue that competent 
management can adapt to running any business. However, a criticism of this viewpoint could 
be seen in the fact that Berkshire Hathaway is specifically geared towards investment and has 
no central core proposition that necessitates support from its ventures. As such, any 
investment made is predicated solely on the basis of a tangible and expected financial return. 
 
Conversely, analysis of Delta Airlines’ investment into the Trainer Oil Refinery has yet to 
play out an either significantly positive or negative impact. Purchased for USD 150 million in 
2012, the refinery had lost USD 136 million by mid-2013, however the correspondent drop in 
Delta’s fuel price-per-gallon of 5.4% and second quarter 2014 profits of USD 13 million 
(CNBC, 2013, CAPA, 2013) reveals potential for the investment, but it is crucial to note that 
profits must significantly improve to offset acquisition and initial loss expenditure. The 
facility’s ability to service one of its primary strategic threats (the volatility of oil prices) 
could be seen as a long-term remedy for this. However, the argument could be made that 
Delta lacks the organisational competencies and infrastructure to mitigate the risk of 
investing in Trainer (a view espoused by former IATA CEO and Director General, Giovanni 
Bisignani
3
), despite Krishnan and Ellis’ argument that good management could win out. 
 
2.2 Marketing power 
 
In contrast to Pakneiat et al. (2007), Aaker (1991) suggests that the establishment of a ‘brand 
umbrella’ allows firms to enter new markets more quickly regardless of a lack of prior 
expertise, with a reduction in risk due to the established strength of the central brand. 
Although it is important to note that the brand must possess widespread consumer familiarity, 
the associated benefits of an ‘elastic’ brand4 have allowed airline groups such as Virgin and 
Emirates to market a wide range of services based on a perception of ‘prestige’ (Park et al, 
1986). Limits may be placed on the elasticity of a brand by consumer trends (Monga and 
John, 2010), resulting in a lifestyle brand being perceived as past its prime; however, the 
Virgin Group in particular has leveraged its brand equity to successfully sell into a range of 
sectors such as airlines, consumer retail, media and finance simultaneously, largely on the 
basis of positive brand perception (Pringle and Field, 2008). The positive aspects of 
diversification, regardless of whether it is related or unrelated, are ultimately connected with 
                                                          
3
 Personal interview with Giovanni Bisignani, former CEO and Director General, IATA. 
4
 The American Marketing Association defines ‘brand elasticity’ the ability of a company’s brand to ‘stretch’ to 
sell a diverse range of often unrelated products under the same marque. (AMA, 2010). 
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the group’s ability to project its brand across multiple sectors, consequently increasing 
consumer awareness. 
 
Even the cessation of trading by the headline brand arguably did not harm many of the sub-
brands of the SAir Group, as can be seen in Figure 2 below. Many of Swissair’s business 
units continue to be active in the marketplace, including Swissport, Gate Gourmet, Rail 
Gourmet, Balair (reorganised as Belair), Swissotel, SR Technics and Crossair (reorganised as 
Swiss International Air Lines). 
 
Figure 2 SAir Group Structure circa 2001  
 
Source Adapted by author 
Note: Still Active SAir Group Subsidiaries highlighted in red 
 
It may be inferred from the example of the SAir Group that the often stronger earning 
potential of higher-margin, non-airline subsidiaries may provide greater benefits to the lower-
margin airline itself, than vice versa. The integration of so-called “invisible assets” (Teece, 
Pisano, & Shuen, 1997) refers to the intangible benefits reaped by marketing in a diversified 
business which lend themselves to the individual survival of SAir’s units, not so much for 
their linkage to an admittedly tarnished brand, but due to their ability to leverage existing 
commercial and consumer relationships built under the group’s original brand umbrella. 
Indeed, Suen (2002) argues that SAir’s downfall was closely linked to its reliance on 
unprofitable airline equity partners, which drained cash and resources, limiting its ability to 
respond to external shocks. Conversely, the related supporting ventures within the SAir group 
acted as a strength, having “permeated its partners’ operations”, adding scale and external 
sales capability. Consumer perceptions of product quality may allow a firm to promote 
widespread usage of the core brand to generate awareness in related areas, further building 
brand equity and growing sales. Emirates’ goal of establishing itself as a ‘lifestyle brand’5 
would appear to support Suen’s assertion about SAir Services in a modern context. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Personal interview with Fabio Prestijacopo, Vice President Business Support & DLM, Emirates 
Group. 
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2.3  Knowledge gain 
 
The ability for subsidiaries to inform learning across the business is made apparent by 
Heracleous et al’s (Pg 38, 2004) assertion that Singapore Airlines (SIA) benefits from a 
notable “transfer of learning” between subsidiaries through staff job rotation. This encourages 
greater group-level oversight of the organisation, as opposed to business-unit level 
compartmentalisation. The net gain of employee competency and knowledge of multiple 
areas can be spread throughout the wider business. Support for this enhanced ability to 
inform the business’ capabilities through cross-sharing of knowledge can be found in Day 
(1990), who defines the concept of corporate ‘capabilities’ as a “complex bundle of skills and 
accumulated knowledge that enable firms (or strategic business units) to coordinate activities 
and make use of their assets”. As such, the greater a firm’s ability to leverage knowledge 
gained through diversification, so too will follow its strategic capability to deal with a 
broader range of threats. If Porter’s argument, that a company must ‘relate to its environment’ 
to flourish strategically, is applied to Heracleous (2004) and Day’s (1990) assertions, then the 
intangible benefits of group-level knowledge gain must be viewed as particularly important in 
informing the positive aspects of adopting a diversified strategy. 
 
There are also some key pitfalls related to following a diversification strategy. Jenkins et al’s 
(2012) study of Air Asia refers to the concept of ‘dominant logic’ within a group as a driver 
of how it pursues its strategy of diversification. If a group’s prevailing logic is geared towards 
taking a purely strategic approach to diversifying and supporting core competencies with 
relevant business units, then related diversification occurs as its default mode of strategic 
growth. However, when the dominant logic of a group is primarily ‘philosophical’ in nature 
(Pakneiat et al., 2010) and diversification is approached on the basis of pursuing growth 
opportunities for financial returns regardless of sector, then whilst general capabilities and 
knowledge may grow, the ability to leverage centralised strategic gains does not – resulting in 
unrelated diversification.  
 
Where errant corporate logic is present, a firm’s need to diversify may be ill-informed or 
unable to adapt to rapidly changing market conditions. This in effect mirrors the stock-market 
concept of a ‘value trap’, whereby an investment may appear to be sound in isolation, but can 
prove toxic to a portfolio due to consistent underperformance, or in this case its inability to 
aid the business in relating to its marketplace, as per Porter. Ansoff also supports this notion, 
arguing that companies may generate new competition through diversification from strong 
incumbents that it is underequipped to counter. 
 
3. Data sources and methods 
Two case study airline groups Lufthansa and Emirates were selected for strategic and 
financial assessment on the basis that both are well established conglomerates that could 
possibly act as a blueprint for other carriers considering diversification as a strategy. Through 
the use of a number of commonly used strategic analysis tools the two Groups’ diversified 
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businesses could be compared in order generate recommendations for a uniform or a non-
uniform approach to vertical integration. The Strategic Scoring Method, employed for this 
study was based upon a selected series of strategic and financial criteria employing 
qualifiable insights as referenced against the BCG and SWOT matrices. One overall business 
unit ranking based on an average composite of standardised factors was then determined. 
 
It was intended to be primarily allegorical and illustrative, producing an ‘Indicative Result’ 
that was subsequently analysed and critiqued. The majority of factors were quantitative, with 
a number of qualitative exceptions, which are based on clear statements of fact drawn from 
industry reports and expert interviews exclusive to this study. Each business unit analysis in 
section 4 is presented with a summary table, showing an Average Score and Indicative 
Result
6
. Using the example of LSG SkyChefs, the way the strategic scoring system works at 
the business unit level is shown below in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 LSG SkyChefs Scoring Table 
LSG SkyChefs Underachiever Weak 
Performer 
Strong 
Performer 
Best in class 
Parent 
company 
revenue growth 
(avg. 2009-
2014) 
Negative to 5% 6-10% 11-20% 21-30% + 
Parent 
company profit 
growth (avg. 
2009-2014) 
Negative to 5% 6-10% 11-20% 21-30% + 
Business Unit 
revenue growth 
(YOY) 
Negative to 5% 6-10% 11-20% 21-30% + 
Business unit 
market share 
0-5% 6-10% 11-15% 16-20% + 
BCG Position Dog Question Mark Cash Cow Star 
Historical 
market growth 
Less than 0-5% 6-10% 11-15% 16-20% + 
Market outlook Weak Fairly weak Fairly positive Positive 
Number of 
strategic 
options 
available 
0 1 2 3 
Average score 2.6 
Indicative 
result 
1 Consider resale or 
restructure 
2 Retain and 
review 
3 Invest in BU 
and build value 
4 Divest or 
leverage 
 
The factors measured are informed by the following criteria: 
                                                          
6
 Full tables showing all business units can be made available upon request to the corresponding author 
frankie.oconnell@cranfield.ac.uk. 
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 Parent Company Revenue Growth is taken as an average. Neither Lufthansa 
Group or Emirates Group achieved higher than 30% year-on-year growth, 
hence the capping of this scale at 30%. Revenue is used as a proxy for the 
earnings potential of the parent and as such the cash resources available to its 
Business Units. 
 Parent Company Profit Growth follows an identical logic. Profit is 
employed as a proxy for assessing the viability of the parent and as such, the 
stability of the Business Unit's position in the group (e.g. weak profits may 
incentivise the parent to sell Business Units). 
 BU Revenue Growth indicates the trend followed by the business unit and its 
base financial value to the group. A figure for Profit is not included as this is 
not published by the Emirates Group, so it would not be possible to 
standardise with Lufthansa Group results. 
 BU Market share illustrates the Business Unit's strength in its respective 
market. 
 BCG Position further underpins BU market share by noting the combination 
of relative market share and market growth to find its overall positioning in 
the market, as per BCG matrix rankings (Dog, Star, etc.). 
 Historical Market Growth observes the trend followed by the market in 
which the Business Unit operates. 
 Market Outlook accounts for the potential of the business unit, which is 
based on whether the market that the business unit operates in is expected to 
grow, contract or remain static. This serves to underwrite the 'Parent Profit 
Growth' metric in assessing future prospects. 
 Strategic Options Available relates to the number of Strategic Options 
identified by the Ansoff matrix as areas for potential development - a low 
number of options may indicate a business unit with little potential for growth. 
 Average Score denotes the average of the above rankings to provide a final 
positioning. 
 The Indicative Result category is adapted from the options found in the BCG 
matrix ('Product Development', 'Divestment', et al) to provide a notional 
understanding of the business unit’s strategic value  
Interviews were conducted with a mix of experts from inside and outside the two selected 
Airline Groups all of which were carried out in the year 2014. They were open ended, semi-
structured interviews that were carried out face-to-face and over the phone. The intended 
purpose of the interviews was to provide an enhanced narrative to the financial and strategic 
numerical data on the two airline conglomerates. As such, key excerpts from the interviews 
are located across sections 2 to 6 in support of or in contrast to literature and data obtained 
from secondary sources.  
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4. Overview and business trend analysis 
 
4.1 Lufthansa Group 
The Lufthansa Group operates under a relatively simple structure, with the overall group 
being constituted of five main ‘business segments’: Passenger (relating solely to the 
passenger carrying activities of Lufthansa airlines, excluding ventures such as Germanwings), 
Logistics (cargo), Technik (maintenance), IT Services and LSG SkyChefs (catering). Each 
reportable segment operates as a standalone P&L centre, with detailed results of revenue 
(both ‘internal’ – i.e. revenue gained from servicing clients within the Group – and ‘external’, 
accounting for third party work), capital expenditure, profit, operating margins and employee 
strength being published.  
Comparative analysis of Lufthansa’s business units has been benchmarked against 
performance figures for its core Passenger division, which accounts for the dominant share of 
group revenue (Figure 3 below). As the group’s largest operational entity, Passenger can 
serve as a bellwether for tracking Lufthansa’s fortunes against the wider market. 
Additionally, the Group’s business units are dependent on both the airline’s fortunes and the 
wider market as a measure of demand for their services, given that they tender for contracts 
on a competitive basis both within and outside of the Lufthansa Group
7
. 
Figure 3 Lufthansa Group BU Revenue Contributions 
 
Source Adapted from LH Group Annual Report 2013-2014  
Measures of productivity employed in the following analysis are largely centred on the split 
between internal and external revenue delivered by business units, operating profit margins 
and employee productivity. All of these factors are compared to Passenger division results to 
show the degree to which Lufthansa Group’s business units are able to offset weak trading in 
the group’s core competency, as well as demonstrate their generally stronger earning 
potential. 
Although it is important to note that these business units would likely not exist without the 
Passenger division, they do not draw the majority of their revenue from servicing it. 
                                                          
7
 Personal interview with Harald Heppner, Manager Corporate Strategy – Lufthansa Group. 
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Comparative analysis of business units highlights areas of strong performance and a general 
trend for higher margins over Lufthansa’s core passenger business, as seen in Figure 4 and 
Table 4: 
Figure 4 LH Group Comparative Operating Margins 2009 – 2014 
 
Table 4 LH Group Comparative Average Operating Margins 2009–2014 
Passengers 1.9% 
Logistics 1.9% 
MRO 8.4% 
Catering 3.3% 
IT 3.6% 
Source(s) Adapted from LH Group Annual Reports 2013-2014 
MRO initially appears to be particularly strong, but further analysis in section 4.1.2 illustrates 
the underlying factors that may suggest its future could be in doubt. Indeed, headline figures 
for all revenue contributions require closer analysis. Whereas Figure 5 (below) may show 
Logistics to have the highest percentage of external revenue (99%), it is important to note that 
this is achieved by default, as Logistics lacks internal trading partners. This is followed by 
LSG SkyChefs at 76%, which possesses a dominantly outward-looking revenue stream and a 
fairly static overall revenue contribution. Conversely, MRO and IT’s ability to balance 
internal and external revenue, with a trend towards external growth in each demonstrates they 
have high growth potential as standalone units, with a bias towards financial rather than 
purely strategic. 
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Figure 5 LH Group External Revenue as % 
 
Source Adapted from LH Group Annual Reports 2009-2014  
4.1.1 – Logistics: Business Trends Analysis 
Cargo presents a mix of fortunes for any airline group, Laurie Berryman, Vice President UK, 
Emirates Airline, asserts that it is arguably one of the only diversified revenue streams 
available to airlines “by default”. Harald Heppner, Manager Corporate Strategy, Lufthansa, 
agrees, noting that cargo is an “in-built, ready-to-use asset”. The ability to enter the cargo 
market is available by virtue of already possessing bellyhold capacity that would otherwise 
be left solely for baggage or mail transport. In spite of this low initial barrier-to-entry, it is 
also a notoriously challenging sector, particularly due to its sharing of fuel cost with 
passenger operations (Holloway, 2008). Although this has the potential to cross-subsidise 
operations in both areas, inefficiencies inherent to the cargo arena can be difficult to 
overcome. Flexibility may be built into the model by introducing pure-freighter aircraft to 
offset gaps in the passenger network (Flight Global, 2013), but the costs of freighter 
introduction and operation often outweigh the benefits of leveraging bellyhold capacity if 
operational scale is insufficient (Morrell, 2007). 
Global cargo market downturn towards 2011-2012 (Flight Global, 2013) has seen Logistics’ 
operating margin collapse from a 2010 high of 11.4% to a 2009 low of -8%; both the 
respective highest and lowest of any Lufthansa Group business units. Despite scaling back 
pure-freighter growth plans (Flight Global, 2013), revenues recovered in 2013 to gain USD 
500 million on 2009 levels, however this is still a decrease year-on-year versus 2012 (USD 
3.49bn) and 2011(USD 3.9bn). A side benefit of this could be seen in the elimination of 
competitors, particularly in the pure-freight arena, where Air France/KLM has withdrawn the 
majority of its fleet (CAPA, 2013), although this has also benefited fast-growing competitors 
in the Arabian Gulf. 
The Logistics’ margin growth figures noted in Table 4 indicate that negative revenue growth 
(Figure 6 below) has in fact been outstripped by negative margin growth, combined with 
negative employee growth - which suggests an organisation becoming progressively more 
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inefficient year-on-year. This is further compounded by 2014 revenues outstripping those of 
competitor Emirates by USD200 million. Although it was able to generate more revenue on 
fewer FTK’s (Freight Tonne Kilometers) than Emirates - with 278,528,303 to Emirates’ 
337,219,971 (CAPA, 2014) - this is not necessarily indicative of wider efficiencies. When its 
negative profit-to-negative-revenue-growth is considered, Logistics ability to deliver margins 
arguably fails to overcome this small bonus. 
Figure 6 Logistics Revenue Trend 2009 – 20148 
 
Source Adapted from LH Group Annual Reports 2009-2014  
Although Logistics is presently seeing a downturn and is subject to a high degree of 
cyclicality, it is nevertheless able to deliver benefits to the wider group even when its own 
financial prospects are challenged – this demonstrates a particular strength of diversification. 
IATA noted moderate growth of 1.8% in the cargo market in 2013, with the trend expected to 
continue into 2014 (IATA, 2014). As such, although the cargo market is currently weak, 
Logistics’ cost cutting should position it well to capitalise on a sector predicted to rebound. 
Below is a SWOT summary for Lufthansa Logistics (Table 5). 
Table 5 Logistics SWOT summary 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Economies of scope with passenger network 
(broad bellyhold network) 
Poor profit margins 
High overheads of pure freighter fleet 
Cash cow market position High capital expenditure 
Opportunities Threats 
Cargo downturn has eliminated some 
competitors 
Weak global cargo market 
Freighter re-fleeting programme Growing strength of Gulf cargo carriers 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 Logistics External Revenue (USD 3,423,850,000) contributes 99% of Total Revenue (USD 3,457,416,000). 
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4.1.2 Technik: Business Trends Analysis 
Despite producing healthy results and a proven ability to offset losses made by other 
divisions, analysis of wider industry trends indicates attractiveness of the MRO sector may be 
subject to erosion. Mr. Heppner notes the cost-effectiveness of in-house solutions from 
airframe and engine manufacturers (OEM’s) presents an attractive prospect to customers, due 
to an in-house MRO’s natural fit within its value chain. Indeed, OEM’s consequently achieve 
“double digit” margins, versus an MRO industry average of 7%. When viewed against the 
trend of negative airline profitability (Aviation Week, May 2013), the lower-cost alternative 
of OEM’s in the space traditionally occupied by companies such as Technik will serve as a 
growing cause of concern for the Lufthansa Group. This is highlighted by the fact that over 
80% of customers for General Electric’s ‘LEAP’ geared turbofan engines have purchased 
‘TotalCare’ packages, providing lifetime care for maintenance and spare parts, bypassing 
MRO’s. Indeed Chris Doan, CEO of consultancy, TeamSAI expects OEM to achieve 
“overwhelming mastery of the market” in the near-term (AFM, 2013, FlightGlobal, 2011). 
Within this sphere, a natural alliance between OEM’s and independent MRO providers may 
develop, with a strong potential for marrying the “intellectual property” required for spare 
part manufacturing of the OEM to the “local knowledge” of MRO’s (Aviation Week, Nov 
2012). This ultimately serves to squeeze providers like Technik in the middle. The threat to 
Technik here may be inferred as an erosion of its ability to provide an end-to-end service to 
clients that is competitive in both price and global reach against OEM / independent joint-
ventures. 
Technik’s reliance on volume of checks performed to inform the scale of its business 
(Aviation Week, May 2012) allows it to realise strong profits. However, its status as a 
‘major’ purchaser of OEM aftermarket equipment does simultaneously fuel its main 
competitors’ revenues. Over time, it is arguable that this will contribute to thinning margins, 
as OEM’s grow in stature. Technik aims to negotiate access to OEM intellectual property and 
ultimately begin fabricating components itself. If successful, then it may be able to sustain its 
present market position, but this does represent its only major tactic to mitigate the growing 
OEM presence. However, if it fails in this objective, then Walter Heerdt, SVP of Marketing 
& Sales for Technik notes that the setback would be “difficult to overcome” (Aviation Week, 
May 2012) – suggesting steadily worsening prospects for Technik’s viability in a fast-
changing MRO landscape. 
MRO contributes the healthiest operating margins within the Lufthansa Group, averaging 
8.4% between 2009 and 2013, comfortably more than double the five year averages for all 
other business units, including passenger. It is also one of the most consistent performers in 
terms of margin growth (Figure 7 below), showing a dip following cuts made in 2009, but 
recovering towards 2013. Technik’s strong results may be illustrated by its operating profit in 
2013, which matched 81% of the Passenger division’s own profit. Similarly, in 2011 
Passenger made a non-proportional inverse 81% of Technik’s operating profit. 
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Figure 7 Technik Operating Margin 
 
Source Adapted from LH Group Annual Reports 2009-2014  
Figure 8 Technik Revenue 
 
Source Adapted from LH Group Annual Reports 2009-2014 
Technik requires a relatively low capital expenditure versus revenues, averaging USD 160 
million from 2014 to 2009, although it is worth noting that much of its assets - particularly 
facilities - are grandfathered and as such, amortised over a long period of time. As such, these 
low legacy costs position Technik as a solid investment for the Lufthansa Group. However, it 
is arguable that the capital costs for any other carrier wishing to move into this sector for the 
first time would be very high (Flight Global, 2011), negating the benefits currently seen by 
Lufthansa. The case may be that MRO is a strong sector for businesses with existing 
operations, but the financial barriers to entry are high, dampening the potentially solid 
margins it is capable of achieving otherwise. 
It is also an employee-intensive operation, requiring 20,000 staff – which despite being less 
than half of Passenger’s requirements, does still show that it has the second lowest 
productivity-per-employee rate within Lufthansa Group. This is exacerbated by a costly, 
entrenched union structure (Irish Independent, 2013), which when combined with the OEM 
dilemma, may play their part in reducing the attractiveness of Technik as an investable asset 
in the long term. These strategic points are summarised below in Table 6. 
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Table 6 Technik SWOT summary 
Strengths Weaknesses 
High margins relative to Group average Employee intensive 
Limited legacy costs High average wages 
Resilience against external shocks Low margins relative to OEMs 
Opportunities Threats 
Potential to partner with OEMs Encroachment of OEMs in MRO market 
Acquisition of intellectual property Failure to acquire ‘intellectual property’ 
 
4.1.3  LSG SkyChefs: Business Trends Analysis 
Much of SkyChefs’ currently robust financial position was foreshadowed by results leading 
up to 2010, with operating profit and revenue increasing year-on-year (8% and 2% 
respectively) – however the impact of Lufthansa’s cost-cutting programme (known as 
‘SCORE’) on SkyChefs’ becomes apparent when it is considered that 2010’s operating 
margin and operating profit were decreasing significantly as costs and revenue increased. As 
such, the efficiency gains seen are tangible and indicative of a company now operating in a 
more competitive manner. Mr. Heppner notes that SkyChefs’ is “required to competitively 
bid for all Lufthansa Group business, nothing is taken as given”, with an average of 76% of 
its revenue generated externally (Figure 9 below), showing no reliance on Passenger 
operations to generate business. It may be reasonable to infer that in light of Lufthansa’s 
continued need for cost cutting, SkyChefs’ need to win Group business by being the lowest 
bidder (and therefore depressing yields) may not always be in the Group’s best interest, if it 
can instead generate stronger returns from winning external business. 
Figure 9 SkyChefs Revenue 
 
Source Adapted from LH Group Annual Reports 2009-2014 
Ultimately, despite LSG’s market leading position9 Lufthansa Group has investigated options 
for divestment – initially in 2012, with no success in securing a bidder. Morgan Stanley notes 
                                                          
9
 LSG SkyChefs is the single largest airline catering business, accounting for 30% of the global marketplace 
worth up to USD11 billion (LSG SkyChefs, 2014). 
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that Lufthansa views SkyChefs’ as ‘non-core’ – and that an increasing appetite for 
consolidation in the catering market was likely to push Lufthansa towards sale (Morgan 
Stanley, 2012). Following the divestment of unprofitable subsidiaries as part of the SCORE 
programme (e.g. BMI British Midland), the Group turned its attention to the sale of profitable 
assets, as part of a broader strategy to realign its core competencies (DW/Reuters, 2012). 
Indeed, a potential bidder for the business emerged in the Emirates Group, which has 
remained open to purchasing the business should it be offered again (Bloomberg, 2013).  
The sale of a profitable, market leading business unit to a primary competitor could be 
observed as a strategic threat to the Lufthansa Group. However, it could also represent a 
significant opportunity due to the potential for Lufthansa Group to sell SkyChefs at a time of 
predicted market growth,
10
 maximising the sale value of the business unit. Equally, Lufthansa 
Group could miss out on the opportunity to retain a newly cost-efficient, market leading 
business unit poised to deliver strong returns. 
Although employee numbers have increased by 4,000 from 28,000 in 2009 to circa 32,000 in 
2013, initially suggesting cost inflation, measurement against operating profit and total 
revenue shows increasing productivity. This is particularly impressive when viewed against 
the fact that comparisons with previous years are not like-for-like; with 2013 showing a 
greater operating profit per employee than 2012, concurrent to an increase in operating 
margin of 0.4% despite adding 2,000 employees to the business. 
Although these gains are not significant, it shows that SkyChefs has controlled costs whilst 
expanding revenues, driving investment (capital expenditure increased significantly in 2013 
versus previous years) and headcount, falling into line with SCORE’s stated objective of 
maximising value ‘at all suppliers’ (LH SCORE Expert Session, 2013), specifically including 
internal suppliers. 
SkyChefs has a large global presence and often operates in regions where Lufthansa has no 
passenger division presence. The benefits of SkyChefs’ high degree of independence can be 
seen in its financial results, with growth in operating results outstripping revenue growth 
between 2013 and 2009, despite mixed results for its parent company during that period. 
Although it has been subject to the SCORE programme, its ability to independently control 
costs has allowed it to nuance its approach and deliver progressively greater financial value to 
its parent (See Table 7 for a SkyChef SWOT summary). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10
 The global catering market is set to grow explosively – up to USD16.5 billion by 2016, counteracting several 
years of static and negative growth. Despite growth in passenger numbers, catering spend has remained static, 
due to airline budget cuts (PRWeb, 2013). 
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Table 7 SkyChefs SWOT summary 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Market leader Servicing parent company not guaranteed 
Largely independent of LH for revenues Weak market (at present) 
Economies of scope with LH group Manpower intensive business 
Opportunities Threats 
Strong market growth predicted Divestment strongly considered by parent 
Ability to service clients throughout the LH 
Group 
Growth of new suppliers 
 
4.2 Emirates Group 
In order to assess Emirates’ diversification strategy, the structure of how results are 
accounted for within the Emirates Group must be clearly understood. Ram Menen, the retired 
founding executive of Emirates SkyCargo notes the Emirates Group has “a very different 
model”, with revenue being generated by two distinct entities: Emirates Airline and Dnata. 
Both entities share common Finance, IT and Human Resources to generate economies of 
scope. Functions such as Finance and IT are administered as part of Dnata, but act on behalf 
of the entire group. A simplified visual interpretation of how the business units of Emirates 
Group are structured can be seen in Figure 10. 
Figure 10 Emirates Group Business Units – Lines of Reporting 
 
Source Authors, derived from Emirates Group Annual Reports, 2009–2014 
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Some revenue streams report under Dnata exclusively, or jointly between Emirates Airline 
and Dnata (Destination & Leisure Management and Travel Services), depending on their 
degree of interface with the passenger airline business. For example, within the Emirates 
Group, both Emirates Airline and Dnata operate travel businesses, noted as ‘Destination & 
Leisure Management (DLM)’ by the airline and ‘Travel Services’ by Dnata. However, both 
areas perform very similar functions, with those under the airline umbrella servicing its 
specific needs more closely and those under Dnata providing services to a wider range of 
clients. As such, this section analyses DLM and Travel Services and other such overlaps as 
one overall area contributing a net benefit to the Emirates Group as a whole. 
Benchmarking of Emirates Group results presents a different challenge to analysis of 
Lufthansa Group by virtue of the complexity of its organisational structure and less 
comprehensive financial reporting. No in-depth financial statistics on individual business 
units are published, despite operating them as P&L centres. Instead reporting is limited to 
evaluating Group level performance, with additional commentary on the revenue 
contributions of its business units. This absence of published operating ratios for business 
units limits comparison with Passenger division results (as per Lufthansa Group’s 
methodology), as revenue alone does not offer insight into the strategic benefit delivered by 
each unit to the Group.  
To generate insight into Emirates’ strategy and the trends it is subject to, this section explains 
relationships between Group business units and their role in driving the Group. Revenue 
generation will be utilised as a KPI for each unit, cross-referenced against personal interviews 
conducted with senior executives across the Emirates Group to form a picture of both their 
performance and strategic value to the Group.  
The overall split in revenue between Emirates Airline and Dnata within the group is heavily 
weighted towards Emirates, with Dnata accounting for an average of 8% of Group revenues 
between 2009 and 2014 (Figures 11 and 12). However, Dnata’s profit margin is on average 
more than double Emirates Airline’s, at 14% versus 5.7% (Emirates Financial Reports, 2009 
– 2014).  
Figure 11 Emirates Group Revenue Contributions 
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Figure 12 Emirates Group Comparative Margins 
 
Source Adapted from Emirates Group Annual Reports 2009-2014 
Such margins are particularly impressive when it is considered that up to 40% of Dnata’s 
workforce is based outside of the UAE (Emirates Group Annual Report, 2014), where labour 
cost is one of the core drivers of the Emirates Group’s cost advantage (CAPA, 2014). 
Additionally, the intangible contribution of Dnata’s service divisions to Emirates Airline’s 
bottom line cannot be underestimated, with the carrier dependent on much of the 
infrastructure it provides, despite not having to directly bear the cost of their operation – 
arguably distorting the picture. It may not be unreasonable to infer that this cross-
functionality, combined with the healthier margins of Dnata as a whole present an attractive 
case for diversification within the Emirates Group, with a greater bias towards strategic 
value, rather than the financial bias evident within Lufthansa. 
4.2.1 SkyCargo: Business Trends Analysis 
Emirates’ SkyCargo division has achieved the remarkable feat of expanding its business in a 
shrinking global freight market, achieving growth “against the industry norm” (SkyCargo, 
2014). In 2014 it delivered 15% of group transport revenues with a total uplift of 2.3 million 
tonnes of cargo in (Emirates Annual Reports 2009 – 2014), comfortably remaining the 
Emirates Group’s largest non-core business unit as well as the world’s largest cargo airline by 
available freight tonne kilometres (CAPA, 2014). 
SkyCargo has largely grown through the natural introduction of bellyhold capacity from 
Emirates Airline’s passenger growth, as well as utilising pure freighters11. The freighters in 
particular provided what Mr. Menen calls a “clear and independent distribution capability” 
with which to significantly grow the business at a time when other airlines have been 
reducing freighter fleets. He also points out that this independence is seen in SkyCargo being 
granted full P&L on freighter operations and a remit to operate as “an airline within an 
airline”, driving efficiency.  
                                                          
11
 Freighters are operated as a mix of wholly-owned or leased aircraft (Boeing 777-200LRF) and wet-leased 
Boeing 747-400ERF’s on Aircraft, Crew, Maintenance & Insurance (ACMI) contracts originally from Atlas Air 
and later, TNT Airways (TNT Airways, 2012 / Airline Cargo Management, 2013). 
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Mr. Menen looks to ‘speed’ as a core strength, believing that in the time-sensitive arena of 
global logistics, whenever speed is lost, cost creep sets in and competitive advantage is lost. 
This underpins the strategic nature of Emirates’ investment in the SkyCargo business, which 
despite delivering large volumes of revenue to the Group in its own right, is also key to 
aiding the justification of the passenger route network. Mr Berryman notes the “significant 
added value” of cargo operations to passenger routes due to its ability to provide a more 
dynamic product mix at a limited increase in cost-of-sale. 
The Group’s strategy of centralising core-functions enabled Mr. Menen and his team the 
“freedom” to significantly reduce cost, expedite decision times and attain the speed-to-market 
necessary to outmanoeuvre competitors. SkyCargo often competes for group financial 
resources, with the company noting that “Emirates’ management monitors the operating 
results of its business units for the purpose of making decisions about resource allocation” 
(Emirates Group Annual Report, 2014) 
Mr. Menen argues that instead of hampering progress, the need to propose a robust case to 
compete for resources has strengthened the analytical capability of Emirates’ divisions – 
enhancing their business acumen (a form of ‘knowledge gain’, as discussed in section 2), 
which he believes sees significant transfer to other commercial processes within the division, 
resulting in a more effectively run overall business. 
This analytical nous and quick speed-to-market has seen revenues increase from USD1.8bn 
to USD3bn. Further to this, since the division’s inception in 1985, revenues have grown from 
10,000 tonnes of freight (SkyCargo.com, 2009) to 2.5 million tonnes carried (Emirates Group 
Annual Report, 2014). Average year-on-year growth stands at approximately 13% between 
2009 and 2014, with the most significant growth occurring between 2009 and 2010 at 27%, 
versus 8% for most other years (Figure 13). This leap in earnings can be attributed to the 
introduction of the Boeing 777-200LRF pure freighter in March 2009 (SkyCargo.com, 2009). 
Figure 13 SkyCargo Revenue 
 
Source Adapted from EK Group Annual Reports 2009-2014 
SkyCargo’s dependence on Emirates Airlines’ bellyhold capacity - which accounts for 74.8% 
of total cargo tonnage capability, can present drawbacks. The relative tonnage gap (35%) 
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between an Airbus A380-800 versus the longer Boeing 777-300ER means that as more A380 
destinations come ‘online’, overall cargo tonnage may decrease in key ports-of-call. 
Mr. Menen is unconcerned by this development, noting that the proliferation of A380 
operations is often offset by the introduction of new frequencies and growing parallel 
opportunities. Mr. Berryman explains further, noting that should London Heathrow be 
overbooked for cargo, the company’s scale enables it to transport freight to other UK 
destinations by road, such as Gatwick, Birmingham or Manchester – thus leveraging spare 
capacity to retain business and offsetting capacity losses (Boeing World Air Cargo Forecast, 
2013).  
Similarly, SkyCargo’s movement of the entire pure freighter fleet (Aviation Week, 2014) to 
the new Dubai World Central (DWC) has seen it successfully grow operations between split 
hubs, with ample room to grow built into one of the world’s largest cargo facilities 
(SkyCargo, 2014 / Boeing World Cargo Forecast 2013). This is underpinned by comparison 
with the mixed fortunes of Lufthansa Logistics, whereby SkyCargo’s business model 
demonstrates that its core principal of independent financial operation, mixed with 
capabilities often being sourced at Group level provides a high degree of dynamism and fast 
reaction times. 
Table 8 SkyCargo SWOT summary 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Speed to market Partial reliance on passenger airline 
Autonomy A380 vs. B777 bellyhold disparity 
Broad Emirates network (Bellyhold) 
Opportunities Threats 
Fast growing parent company Weak and volatile global cargo market 
Weakened competitors 
DWC hub growth  
 
4.2.2 – DLM & Travel Services: Business Trends Analysis 
Emirates’ reputation as a ‘travel agent friendly’ airline (Arabian Industry, 2014) is 
underpinned by an integrated value chain servicing as many elements of the customer journey 
as possible. Fabio Prestijacopo, Vice President of DLM describes the company’s ‘Emirates 
Holidays’ unit as a tour operator, but one whose primary mission is “to add value to the 
airline” by acting as an in-house direct sales channel. DLM units such as Emirates Holidays 
allow the Group to sell a complete package over which it has greater control. 
Primarily, this avoids the need to monitor Service Level Agreements, as has been discussed 
with reference to MRO and Catering. Moreover, according to Laurie Berryman, it allows the 
Group to provide more competitive pricing, due to a reduction in servicing costs, such as 
GDS usage fees and agent commissions. Mr. Prestijacopo notes a correspondent benefit in 
gaining “greater ownership of the customer journey”, allowing Emirates DLM to enhance 
service control and quality at a lower cost. 
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From a financial perspective, DLM provides healthy, but relatively small revenues to the 
Emirates group, indicating that its true value is observed in its ability to support customer 
journeys, as observed above. Measurement of trends is somewhat limited by a fragmented 
business structure that until recently has been subject to a degree of duplication
12
 with 
multiple business units possessing similar capabilities. However, this can also have a highly 
positive impact on revenue, as seen in the acquisition of European Online Travel Agent 
(OTA) ‘Travel Republic’ (Travel Weekly, 2012) and the Gold Medal Travel Group (Dnata, 
2014), a former unit of the Thomas Cook Group, which currently operates Netflights.com, a 
leading OTA in the UK market (Travel Weekly, 2012). 
The 2014 Group Financial Report (Emirates Group Annual Report, 2014) observes that the 
acquisition of Travel Republic was instrumental in driving a revenue increase from 
USD153m in 2011 to UD210m in 2012. Mr. Berryman asserts that a further significant 
increase in the business will be seen in 2015, following the integration of the Gold Medal. 
The Group Financial Statement supports this, noting that “the full year impact... will be 
reflected only in the next financial year” (Emirates Group Annual Report, 2014). DLM and 
Travel Services revenue has more than doubled from USD109m in 2010, to USD231m in 
2014 (Figure 14 below), with a relatively small corresponding increase in staff numbers – 
indicating the sector’s ability to grow fast without incurring steep increases in cost. 
Figure 14 DLM & Travel Services (combined) Revenue 
 
Source Adapted from Emirates Group Annual Reports 2009-2014 
The Emirates Group sees potential to segment the direction of its DLM units, with Gold 
Medal continuing its role as an exclusive facilitator of Thomas Cook’s car rental and air 
services needs, whilst integrating its objectives with the Emirates Group’s overall aim of 
“continued tourism growth in the UAE” (Dnata, 2014). The end benefit to the Emirates 
Group can be inferred in Mr. Berryman’s expectation that Gold Medal has the potential to 
drive larger numbers of Thomas Cook passengers to Emirates flights, as well as underpinning 
                                                          
12
 Fabio Prestijacopo points out that the functions of its Emirates Holidays and Dnata Travel brands have often 
overlapped in the past. 
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Mr. Prestijacopo’s comments about enhancing Emirates’ capacity to provide in-house, 
integrated end-to-end journeys for its customers. 
Travel Republic will remain within the pure OTA arena, with Emirates Holidays serving 
direct customers seeking an integrated package. This move towards specialised segmentation 
allows Emirates to maintain a significant presence in the travel services market, whilst re-
orientating this customer stream towards direct sales – reducing dependency on the travel 
agency partners that have long played a vital role in Emirates’ commercial fortunes at a high 
cost-of-sale
13
. 
Table 9 DLM & Travel Services SWOT summary 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Integral to Emirates Airline strategy Fragmented business structure 
Customer ‘ownership’ Relatively small player in a big global market 
No need to monitor Service Level 
Agreements 
Opportunities Threats 
Fast growing global market Travel market can be volatile 
Gold Medal acquisition 
Growing market preference for direct sales Strong incumbents (particularly OTAs) 
 
4.2.3 – Catering: Business Trends Analysis 
The Emirates Group has seen its activity in the catering sector increase dramatically between 
2014 and 2011
14
, despite experiencing the same depressed market as LSG SkyChefs. 
Following Dnata’s acquisition and integration of the Alpha Catering Group (Emirates Group 
Annual Report, 2013) it was catapulted to the position of the fourth largest global catering 
provider. Prior to this, revenues were largely earned from the supply of third party clients at 
DXB. The financial context of this situation can be seen by growth between 2009 and 2014 
totalling 900%, or an increase from USD29m in 2010, to USD317m in 2014. The 2011 
acquisition of Alpha reflects this in a 438% increase in business between 2010 and 2011, with 
revenue moving from USD29m in 2010 to USD157m in 2011. The full integration of Alpha 
may be seen as having ‘bedded down’ in 2012, with a further increase to USD331m, realising 
the full potential of Alpha’s revenues on the Group’s balance sheet. Additionally, a dip for 
2014 – 2013 may be explained by revenue sharing activities with the Lufthansa Group (see 
below). 
  
                                                          
13
 Personal interview with Laurie Berryman. 
14
 Catering was not reported as an individual revenue stream by the Emirates Group until the 2010-11 financial 
year, reflecting the acquisition of the Alpha Catering Group. 
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Figure 15 Emirates & Dnata Catering (combined) Revenue 
 
Source Adapted from Emirates Group Annual Reports 2009-2014 
The Group’s move away from a localised catering operation with limited third party capacity, 
to a globally orientated business resonates with the overall trends seen across other business 
areas of pursuing robust in-house capabilities, leveraged to their full potential by 
internationally focused third party revenue generation. Despite this, Emirates adopts a 
similarly pragmatic line to Lufthansa in its awarding of service contracts. Mr. Berryman 
points out that despite Alpha’s global capabilities, the bidding process is still competitive – 
for example, Emirates Airlines’ catering needs at London Heathrow have been fulfilled by 
Do&Co, an Austrian firm with worldwide operations, instead of Alpha
15
. 
In the pursuit of cost-effective solutions, joint-ventures have emerged. 2012 saw the 
integration of Alpha’s UK operations with those of LSG Skychefs, to form Alpha LSG (LSG 
Skychefs, 2014) – a UK only business, delivering USD512m in revenues with over 3,000 
staff. Both Dnata and the Lufthansa Group retain a 50% stake in the business and will share 
revenues which was formed with the intention of combating a particularly “challenging” 
marketplace in the UK and being able to meet new entrants more effectively (DFNI, 2012). 
This suggests that the growing presence of Do&Co in the UK has become a sufficient enough 
cause for concern to the major incumbents to provoke a strategic response. 
Further expansion may come in the form of LSG SkyChefs itself – a potential acquisition 
target for the Emirates Group’s catering portfolio. Dnata has noted its interest in taking a 
stake (up to 49%), or total ownership of SkyChefs, should the Lufthansa Group ultimately opt 
to divest this business unit. Given the two organisations prior experience of joint venture co-
operation, it may be inferred that such an acquisition would be a good cultural and 
commercial fit for the Emirates Group. Furthermore, with the catering market poised to grow 
to USD16 billion by 2016 (PRWeb, 2013), such an acquisition would position Emirates as 
the global leader in a period of significant market recovery and growth. 
                                                          
15
 Personal interview with Laurie Berryman. 
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This underpins The Emirates Group’s strategy of leveraging business units for internal and 
external gain, with the majority of revenues ultimately being earned from third part work. 
The Alpha LSG joint venture, or any part-purchase of LSG SkyChefs also illustrates the 
pragmatic nature of its approach in a similar vein to its acquisition of Gold Medal Travel – 
showing that it is willing to work with or for competitors such as SkyChefs or Thomas Cook 
and fuel their revenue generation, provided the strategic return to Emirates is sufficient to 
justify the investment. 
Table 10 Catering SWOT summary 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Positioned for global growth Servicing parent company not guranteed 
Alpha flight catering’s broad portfolio Weak market (at present) 
 Manpower intensive business 
Opportunities Threats 
Potential to acquire LSG SkyChefs Growth of new suppliers (e.g. Do&Co) 
Strong market growth predicted 
Alpha-LSG joint venture in UK 
 
5. Strategic analysis and positioning 
5.1 Market growth and relative market share 
The BCG Matrix has been constructed on the basis of each BU’s ‘relative share’ within its 
own market versus the growth rate for that market
16
.The highest growth rate was seen in the 
‘Travel Services’ sector at 12% and the lowest in Flight Catering at 2%, with relative shares 
falling between 100% (for market-leaders such as SkyChefs) and less than 1% (Emirates 
DLM). 
Figure 16 BCG Matrix for EK and LH Business Unit
 
Source Author, from company & industry reports 
                                                          
16
 Market growth rate is posited as an average of year-on-year growth figures between 2009 and 2014, sourced 
from company industry reports. 
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The positioning of Emirates’ BU’s may initially appear surprising, with the majority 
achieving ‘Dog’ or ‘Question Mark’ status. However, the issue of potential is not fully 
covered by the BCG. For example, market growth rate is predicated on past, rather than 
predicted performance. The individual growth rates for business units is also not accounted 
for. The below Strategic Scoring Method establishes encouraging prospects for all of 
Emirates’ business units. Conversely, although Lufthansa Technik may presently be a ‘Cash 
Cow’, it is unlikely to retain this positioning, with a slide towards ‘Dog’ or ‘Question Mark’ 
territory already evident from the BCG. 
The following section analyses the market positioning established by the BCG, with added 
context from the Trend Analysis and SWOT summaries (section 4) to establish strategic 
value and direction for each BU, the options available, as well as their associated risk. 
5.2 Strategic Value & Directionality: Lufthansa 
Logistics is a ‘Cash Cow’. The downturn in the freight market has resulted in low market and 
business unit growth, but its high relative market share in such a market demonstrates an 
ability to perform against wider trends. Additionally, a fairly positive future market outlook 
and a reduction in competitors due to the downturn present a healthy number of strategic 
options, including the ability to grow outside of Emirates SkyCargo’s traffic flows. Logistics 
performs below the group average of a 4.3% margin, but a reinvigorated freight market could 
reverse this. Exposure to risk in the form of pure-freighter operations may be seen as a drain 
or a bonus but trading could improve if Lufthansa turned to pure bellyhold operations, due to 
the sharing of costs with the passenger division. Lufthansa may wish to retain Logistics and 
conduct a strategic review of operations. However, at present the cargo market remains a 
solid investment, so investment and building value may be viable options. 
Technik is a ‘Cash Cow’ with the potential to slip into the ‘Dog’ or ‘Question Mark’ 
quadrants. Relatively flat BU and market growth and the prospect of OEM’s eroding a 
currently strong relative share present a weak outlook. Technik’s own admission that it is 
unwilling to pursue joint-ventures with OEM’s and a risky play for intellectual property 
rights compounds this. Financially, Technik is a strong performer with outstanding margins 
backed by Lufthansa Group’s steadily increasing profitability, although it must be noted that 
sluggish Group revenue growth may hamper cashflow and present Technik as a target for 
divestment in the face of future downturns. Technik may wish to review its strategic 
direction. If successful, it could stand to continue earning from presently strong margins and 
mitigate the influence of OEM’s, but if it does not succeed, then sale may be an option in the 
long term. 
SkyChefs is a ‘Cash Cow’, with the potential to move into ‘Star’ territory – this is due to its 
position as a market leader and forecasts of highly positive growth in the catering market. 
This establishes high potential value, which may not be fully accounted for in the rankings. 
The strategic benefits of controlling in-house catering operations are apparent, but the 
potential for sale underpins its financial value as well. However, a buyer could be Emirates, 
which could deliver value to an already strong competitor, diminishing the strategic 
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attractiveness of selling the unit. Based on current market and business unit growth, it may 
appear to be an underachiever, but its strong future prospects may support retention as a 
prudent strategic and financial option in the short term. SkyChefs sits across boundaries, with 
an indicative direction pointing towards review and investment pending a decision regarding 
divestment. The intangibility of future prospects precludes a higher ranking, but Lufthansa 
may wish to retain and leverage the up-turn of the catering market. 
Table 11 Lufthansa Business Unit Strategic Scoring Summary 
Lufthansa 
Logistics 
Underachiever Weak 
Performer 
Strong performer Best in Class 
Average Score  2.5  
Indicative 
Result 
1. Consider Sale 
or Restructure 
2. Retain and 
Review 
3. Invest in BU 
and Build 
Value 
4. Divest or 
leverage 
Lufthansa 
Technik 
Underachiever Weak 
Performer 
Strong performer Best in Class 
Average Score  2.3  
Indicative 
Result 
1. Consider Sale 
or Restructure 
2. Retain and 
Review 
5. Invest in 
BU and 
Build 
Value 
6. Divest or 
leverage 
LSG SkyChefs Underachiever Weak 
Performer 
Strong performer Best in Class 
Average Score  2.6  
Indicative 
Result 
1. Consider Sale 
or Restructure 
2. Retain and 
Review 
3. Invest in BU 
and Build Value 
4.Divest or 
leverage 
 
5.3 Strategic Value & Directionality: Emirates Group 
Emirates SkyCargo is a ‘Cash Cow’. Market growth is low, but SkyCargo is growing rapidly 
against trends (and is the market leader, with a positive market outlook predicted). This is 
facilitated by drawing marketshare away from competitors. A cost-efficient structure, high 
revenues, a large flexible network, a new hub and a low risk of product and service 
development (see Section 5.4.2) result in a high number of strategic options. Volatility in the 
global cargo market, partial reliance on Emirates Airline’s operations and not always 
securing priority use of internal resources may present financial challenges, but the strength 
of its parent serves to mitigate much of this. Emirates may wish to invest further in SkyCargo 
and build value through an increased global presence, as well as more robust dedicated 
freighter operations – reducing reliance on bellyhold capacity. 
DLM & Travel Services is a ‘Question Mark’ - low share in a large, fast growing global 
market obscures its true value. This sector is of high strategic value to Emirates by virtue of 
its high degree of integration with the passenger airline business. The acquisition of Gold 
Medal and future growth may provide necessary traction to transit to ‘Star’ territory, aided by 
average business unit growth of 137% between 2009-2014. However, high costs, a somewhat 
fragmented and duplicated business structure and a volatile marketplace serve to moderate its 
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financial performance. Potential for significant strategic and financial rewards is high should 
Emirates invest in this sector – pursuing product and market development as priorities, as 
well as reviewing the business structure of the segment. 
Emirates’ Catering unit is a ‘Dog’ which could rapidly progress to being a ‘Star’. Forecasting 
of a significant rebound in the catering market and the acquisition of Alpha Flight Catering 
(the results of which have not yet been fully realised) may serve to rapidly add financial and 
strategic value via increasing marketshare in a growing market. Potential acquisition of LSG 
SkyChefs would consolidate a position as a highly profitable market leader, but this remains 
only a possibility at present and cannot be fully accounted for in the rankings. To prepare for 
growth, Emirates may invest in its Catering division and attempt to build value through 
pursuing the acquisition of SkyChefs. If this is not possible, then it must retain Alpha and 
grow it with the market. 
Table 12 Emirates Business Unit Strategic Scoring Summary 
Emirates 
SkyCargo 
Underachiever Weak Performer Strong 
performer 
Best in Class 
Average Score  3  
Indicative 
Result 
1. Consider Sale 
or Restructure 
2.Retain and 
Review 
3. Invest in BU 
and Build Value 
4.Divest or 
leverage 
Emirates DLM 
and Travel 
Services 
Underachiever Weak Performer Strong 
performer 
Best in Class 
Average Score  3  
Indicative 
Result 
1. Consider Sale 
or Restructure 
2. Retain and 
Review 
3.Invest in BU 
and Build Value 
4.Divest or 
leverage 
Emirates 
Catering 
Underachiever Weak Performer Strong 
performer 
Best in Class 
Average Score  2.75  
Indicative 
Result 
1. Consider Sale 
or Restructure 
2. Retain and 
Review 
3. Invest in BU 
and Build Value 
4.Divest or 
leverage 
 
5.4 Strategic Options & Risk 
The Ansoff matrix can be useful for honing the strategic positioning as developed above into 
actionable, sustainable strategies and supplementing the directionality established by the 
Strategic Scoring Method through the identification of specific areas for development by 
assessing value-to-risk relationship between new and existing business areas. 
5.4.1 – Lufthansa 
Market development for Lufthansa Group presents an issue in light of the fact that 
progression of the business may be dependent on retraction or significant review in some 
areas (notably MRO), as opposed to further market penetration or product and market 
development. However, as no Lufthansa Group business unit fell into the ‘Consider Sale’ 
category, room for review and assessment of the risk of continuing in such sectors means that 
value can still be drawn from the Ansoff matrix. 
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Table 13 Lufthansa Group Ansoff Matrix 
 
A lower risk alternative for Lufthansa Group could be developing new maintenance bases in 
areas of market growth, such as South East Asia, which has seen a proliferation of LCC’s 
with a preference for outsourcing. Consequently, the region’s market value is predicted to see 
growth to USD73 billion by 2023 (AFM, 2013). Additionally, new markets for Logistics that 
lie outside of the east-bound traffic flow directionality of gulf carriers, such as Eastern 
Europe, could prove lucrative with little risk. Spares manufacturing represents another high 
risk strategy. Although Technik does currently hold a limited stake in spares manufacturer 
HEICO Aerospace (Lufthansa Group Annual Report, 2014), section 4 showed that far greater 
investment in this sector is required to effectively combat the entrance of OEM’s. The risks to 
making further investments in a declining sector are apparent, however, should Technik be 
successful in acquiring greater manufacturing capability, or the intellectual property rights 
necessary to become a significant spare parts manufacturer, then the benefits may well 
outweigh the risks. 
Finally, the pursuit of recovering growth trends in existing markets could be taken advantage 
of by Catering and Logistics. The fact that both have survived market contraction and 
retained market leading positions may allow them to leverage this advantage into drawing 
marketshare away from weakened competitors. 
5.4.2 – Emirates 
The Emirates Group’s strong positioning as shown earlier provides a positive outlook for the 
development of all of its BU’s. However, expansion is nevertheless subject to risk, especially 
where the financial and strategic gains are likely to be largest, by virtue of the capital outlay 
required to diversify. 
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Table 14 Emirates Group Ansoff Matrix 
 
Expansion into the youth travel market may open new opportunities for DLM and Travel 
Services, whilst utilising its existing infrastructure – partially financially de-risking the move. 
The youth travel market is expected to grow to 73% from present levels to USD 320 billion 
by 2020 and represent up to 20% of global tourism (SYTA, 2012), representing a highly 
fertile segment in which to expand.  Cargo’s continued growth could be facilitated by 
expanding to new pure freighter markets – reducing its reliance on Emirates Airline’s 
network expansion for growth, by adding capacity in high potential regions such as South 
East Asia and expanding trucking operations (Boeing World Air Cargo Forecast 2013). 
The acquisition of LSG SkyChefs - should Lufthansa opt for sale – represents a significant 
gain for Emirates, however the significant capital outlay required to meet its 2012 estimated 
valuation of USD 1.1 billion (Morgan Stanley, 2012) and the prospect of projected market 
growth failing to materialise increase the risk of pursuing this option. It is nevertheless offset 
by the potential to move into ‘Star’ territory, should acquisition prove possible and 
successful. 
DLM and Travel Services may opt to continue growing organically through its integration 
with Emirates Airline. Laurie Berryman notes that one of the strongest areas for growth in 
Emirates’ portfolio has been “three and four star” travel, as opposed to Dubai’s typical 
association with five star luxury. This growth in lower value, fed by organic volume growth 
in line with the carriers ambitious expansion plans could significantly grow marketshare, 
contributing to its move into the ‘Star’ BCG quadrant. 
Similarly to Lufthansa Logistics, its survival of the global cargo market downturn, the 
subsequent elimination of competitors and its market-leading presence position it well to 
continue growing within a relatively static market at the expense of its competitors. As a 
parallel opportunity to developing new pure freighter operations, it may also continue to rely 
on the organic growth of its bellyhold network. 
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6. Recommendations & Conclusion 
This study has uncovered the following conclusions: 
1. The strategic value of a diversified portfolio of related, non-core subsidiaries can be 
illustrated by the Emirates Group’s investment in Travel Services as a cost-effective 
method of feeding its core passenger transport business through exercising greater 
end-to-end control over the consumer journey. In the case of LSG SkyChefs, the 
Lufthansa Group informs strategic value somewhat differently. Despite LSG 
primarily adding financial value to the group, it also acts as a strategic asset when the 
issue of divestment to a major competitor is considered. As such, the strategic value 
of a business unit may be defined in different ways, dependent upon diverging trends 
and approaches in each company. 
2. Individual and comparative analysis of business unit strengths and weaknesses 
revealed that differing forces driving business units may be symptomatic of both 
industry pressures and parent company strategy. For example, Lufthansa Technik 
appears likely to fall foul of a changing landscape in the MRO industry, but is 
presently well supported and necessary to the Lufthansa Group’s operations. 
Conversely, despite relative autonomy from its parent, Emirates SkyCargo performs 
strongly. As seen in section 4, it is the belief of its most senior management that this 
is a strength afforded in part due to the Emirates Group’s strategy of non-interference 
and internal competition for resources. 
3. An upturn in the global catering market, a downturn in in-house MRO operations at 
the hands of OEM’s and steady growth in the travel services and cargo markets have 
all been independently explored. Furthermore, insight has been gained into the 
potential for growing relationships between diversified business units and core-
competencies (particularly in Travel Service), as well as a business-unit-to-business-
unit view.  
4. Carriers wishing to diversify, or review their current diversified portfolio may draw 
on the examples of Emirates and Lufthansa to understand and relate to the trends 
informing success or failure in the sectors covered.  
Specific recommendations for Emirates and Lufthansa based on the main findings are as 
follows: 
Lufthansa: Growing financial strength for the Group, mirrored by growth amongst its 
business units illustrates that Lufthansa’s diversification strategy has proved a positive 
addition thus far. However, a weak market outlook for Technik and uncertainty over 
SkyChefs’ future with the Group may cast some doubt on Lufthansa continuing as a widely-
diversified business. SkyChefs in particular must be handled with care, due to potential to 
contribute significantly to the Group’s strategic and financial positioning. Lufthansa’s bias 
towards financial value over strategic value is indicative of its squeezed market position and 
catering to shareholders, but it must be careful not to divest or retract from sectors with 
weaker margins that are strategically crucial to supporting core-functions (such as Cargo). 
Divestment of business units may not be a wise option for Lufthansa at present unless its 
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need to generate cash becomes more pressing. Nevertheless, this research points to a clear 
need for a review of strategic options available to each business unit and the pursuit of greater 
efficiencies in tandem with investment in product and service development. It is crucial that 
Lufthansa’s business units keep abreast of market trends to ensure their continued viability, 
as in some areas – particularly Technik– it is in danger of falling behind. 
Emirates: Although Emirates is not experiencing the same financial pressures as Lufthansa 
and exhibits a clear bias towards strategic positioning over financial growth, it is nevertheless 
clearly a pragmatically run business - the sale of Mercator being particularly indicative of 
this. The outlook for all of its business units is positive, with no immediate requirement for 
divestment, but restructuring to eliminate duplication and leverage the strength of the 
Emirates brand would benefit both Catering and DLM and Travel Services. 
DLM and Travel Services and SkyCargo strategic contribution to the group is high and much 
like Lufthansa, should be subject to further investment to continue driving growth both within 
the passenger airline, but also other business units. Provided catering market forecasts are 
accurate, Catering has a bright future through organic growth (Alpha) or acquisitions 
(SkyChefs), but the value of this unit is not primarily strategic, as demonstrated by Emirates’ 
willingness to award third party contracts. As such, should growth targets fall short, further 
outsourcing may be considered as a long-term option. 
Overall the study has demonstrated that, although both airline groups operate their business 
units as Profit and Loss (P&L) centres, Lufthansa exercises a decentralised structure, 
positioning its business units as standalone companies focussed on financial health. 
Conversely, Emirates Group’s business units draw upon a centralised resource pool, with 
managerial autonomy and an emphasis on strategic positioning. The strengths and 
weaknesses of each approach are comparatively scored and analysed, with the results of each 
being largely dependent on both the operating environment of each group and the basis of 
their strategic approach. 
The strengths and weaknesses of diversification may be clearly seen in Emirates and 
Lufthansa – two very different companies pursuing diversification from differing angles. Any 
weakness in the results borne by Lufthansa’s diversification strategy may be seen as 
primarily linked to the Group’s greater exposure to a market squeezed by low-cost 
competition and encroaching Gulf carriers. This forces the need to extract maximum financial 
value from its business units whilst countenancing cost-cutting and even market exit to 
strengthen its financial position. The result of this is a bias towards financial return in its 
diversification strategy, rather than one that is purely strategic. 
It is possible that diversification can act as a drain on resources, particularly when the parent 
company loses sight of changing market trends and fails to adapt its business units, due to a 
diminished stress on strategic oversight. The progress of the Lufthansa SCORE programme is 
apparent in the strengthening of financial results, but this may yet cause Lufthansa to re-focus 
on core-competencies, rather than maintaining a diversified structure. 
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The Emirates case has shown that the primary benefit of diversification has arguably been 
strategic, supporting Pakneiat et al’s (2010) notion that a strategy dominated logic is more 
likely to pay dividends. This also shows that intangible factors such as enhancement of 
competencies and the ability to support internal development are crucial benefits in informing 
parent company profitability. Emirates’ stronger financial standing, with margins almost 
double Lufthansa’s, despite lower revenues, and the higher overall scoring of Emirates’ 
business units in section 4 over Lufthansa may indicate a stronger basis for diversification. 
Additionally, the cost-collapse associated with the resource sharing combined with 
managerial independence allowed Emirates’ units to act as a significant strength. 
It is important to note that any airline wishing to take the insights uncovered in this paper as a 
source of advisory should first ensure that their grounds for comparison are relevant, as each 
group in isolation does ultimately present a positive overall case for diversifying. Indeed, the 
weaknesses in overall strategy are generally only apparent when viewed on a comparative 
basis. It is also crucial to note that the evidence strongly suggests that the success of a 
diversification strategy is less informed by the scope or resources of the parent organisation, 
than by the manner in which it administers its strategy. 
The research is limited by a lack of disaggregate financial data, which prevented to the 
development of some comparable KPI’s (e.g. ROCE). Further data likely to be unavailable 
for public analysis (e.g. factors informing goodwill or amortisation of assets) would require 
assessment, which may reveal further underlying value in retention or sale, but is not 
published by either group. Additionally, the Emirates Group does not publish business unit 
profitability statements, precluding a more in-depth analysis of its operations. As such, 
rankings and final assessment have produced indicative conclusions only. Interrogation into 
the drivers of low cost carrier diversification (e.g. the Easy Group) would provide further 
industry-level insights. Analysis of all business units operated by Emirates and Lufthansa 
may also provide a more detailed insight into their overall strategies. 
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